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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  
Parents face a tradeoff between the number of children they have and the 
resources they can devote to each of those children.  Fertility rates, as measured by the 
number of children per woman, remain particularly high in the developing world.  This 
thesis tests the relationship between regional education conditions in 30 developing 
countries and the fertility decisions of women in those regions.  Most economic 
research examining education and fertility has focused on the impact that increasing an 
individual’s education level has on their own fertility decisions.  This research chooses 
to examine education and fertility through the lens of the parent’s quantity-quality 
tradeoff, a so far largely overlooked aspect of both household and development 
economics. 
Fertility rates have been of interest to economists since at least the time of 
Thomas Malthus (1826).  Malthus created a model in which a limited amount of 
resources in the world is divided among an increasingly large population.  Malthus 
envisioned a disastrous situation in which too large a population would lead to universal 
poverty as the amount of global resources could not support so many individuals.  
While Malthus’ model has been discredited for overlooking technological advances that 
would lead to an increase in resources, an interest in the economic consequences of 
population growth has not disappeared.  Modern development economists continue the 
examination of fertility rates.  
 In the year 2000 the United Nations (UN) released its Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs).  These are eight specific, measurable goals for international 
development aimed at fighting global poverty.  This research is in part motivated by the 
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recognition that this year, 2015, was set as the deadline to achieve MDG targets.  
Among the MDGs is achieving universal primary education (UPE).  Left out of the 
MDGs is any fertility related goal.  Assuming that countries did respond to the MDGs, 
this creates an opportunity to observe how women adjust their fertility decisions to 
improvements in education when they are not direct beneficiaries.  
    
Millennium Development Goals 
 The UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the Millennium Declaration in 
September 2000.  UN member nations committed to eight specific time-bound goals, 
each of which contained quantitative targets by which success would be judged.   The 
MDGs contained no true enforcement or incentive mechanisms and may appear to be 
purely aspirational at first glance, however they have had an influence in both shaping 
development policy and achieving outcomes.  For example, in 2005 donor countries 
agreed to provide $50 billion a year to go towards the MDG of fighting extreme poverty 
and in 2008 committed $16 billion more for MDG initiatives (UNDP 2010).  Beyond 
normal aid flows, wealthier countries have supported the MDGs through debt relief.  
Developing a global partnership for development is one of the MDGs.  A target within 
this MDG is addressing the debt problems of developing countries.  Progress has been 
achieved in this regard.  Debt burdens are significantly lower for developing countries 
now than at the onset of the MDGs, allowing them to dedicate more resources toward 
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achieving other development goals and enhancing productive capacity rather than 
exhausting those resources on servicing debt.1   
 The eight MDGs reflect issues seen as critical for the development trajectory of 
countries.  A number of the goals are tied to health issues (for example reducing 
childhood mortality and improving maternal health) and a full list of the MDGs, targets, 
and indicators is available in the appendix in Table A-3.   
2015 was set as the deadline for countries to achieve all eight MDGs. According 
to the UN’s Millennium Development Goals Report 2014, the success of the MDGs is 
mixed. Some targets have been successfully reached (including cutting extreme poverty 
in half and increasing access to safe drinking water), but most targets remain unmet, 
though the degree by which varies.   
Goal 2 of the MDGs is “Achieve universal primary education”. This goal 
reflects the belief that education is one pillar of development.  The UPE goal is unmet 
globally, but notable progress has been made nonetheless, as discussed later in this 
paper.  The policies to achieve UPE vary, but examples include reductions or removals 
of user fees, increasing the supply of schools, making primary schooling compulsory, 
and providing subsidies to impoverished households (UN Millennium Project 2005).  
Perhaps the simplest of these is the removal of fees combined with compulsory 
education.  In a number of countries this has led to rapid spikes in primary school 
enrollment (Kattan 2006).2 
                                                        
1 According to the UN’s Millennium Development Goals Report 2014, the debt burden of developing 
countries, as measured by the proportion of external debt service to export revenue, was 3.1 percent in 
2012.  In 2000, this measure was at 12 percent.  The success of this target is slightly muted as levels 
appear to have leveled off. 2 An example of a visibly effective national UPE initiative (in this case Tanzania) can be seen in the 
appendix in Figure A-1.   
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Economic Theory 
 Becker (1960) constructed a model of household demand for children by 
applying models of consumer behavior to fertility decisions.  In this model, children are 
goods consumed by parents.  The model of household fertility makes several 
assumptions.  First, parents have perfect control over fertility in both the number of 
children they have and their birth spacing.  As a practical matter, this is achieved 
through modern birth control methods.  Second, parents view children as a good which 
generates utility.  Parents derive some pleasure from having children and in this way 
children are a consumption good.  They may also generate income for parents and in 
this way are a production good.  Parents may see investing in their children’s education 
as generating a payoff later.  This would encourage parents to value educated and 
uneducated children differently depending on returns to education.  Several other 
factors would influence their preferences to include personal and community tastes, 
discount factors, knowledge of and access to birth control, and potential labor needs. 
 A quantity-quality tradeoff model building off this was then constructed by 
Becker and Lewis (1974).  Parents face a tradeoff between the quantity of children they 
can have and the quality of those children.  As they increase the quality of children, the 
price also increases for each child, assuming quality levels are constant across children.  
They face the following budget constraint: (1) 𝐼 = (𝑝 ∗ 𝐶) + 𝑝0(𝑞 ∗ 𝑁) 
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 In this I is parental income.  C is a composite good and p is the price of that 
composite good.  q is the quality of children, N is the quantity of children, and p0 is the 
price of q*N. 
 Solving this equation for number of children we get the following: 
(2) 𝑁 = 𝐼 − (𝑝 ∗ 𝐶)
𝑝0 ∗ 𝑞
 
 This can be represented graphically as such: 
Figure 1: Quantity-Quality Tradeoff in Children 
 
 UPE reforms lower the cost of educating children (increasing quality) 𝑝0.  This 
moves the budget line up graphically.  This model leads us to an ambiguous result with 
regards to child quantity N as quality q increases as a result of UPE.  Theoretically, 
parents may choose either to increase or decrease their fertility levels with this shift in 
the budget line.  This is because of the unknown slope of the indifference curve and the 
curved slope of the budget line, given below: 
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(3) 𝑑𝑁
𝑑𝑞
= −�𝐼 − (𝑝 ∗ 𝐶)
𝑝0
�
1
𝑝02
 
 The differing outcomes can be demonstrated graphically: 
Figure 2: Quantity Increase with Quality Increase Resulting from UPE 
 
 
In this case we observe that quality of children and quantity of children have 
both increased in response to the rotation of the budget line. 
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Figure 3: Quantity Decrease with Quality Increase Resulting from UPE 
 
 In this case we observe that quality of children has increased while quantity of 
children has decreased.  The rotation of the budget line is the same as in Figure 2, 
however a different set of indifference curves is represented.  These theoretical results 
are ambiguous, indicating the need to examine the relationship empirically. 
 Universal primary education and similar reforms which have several potential 
effects within this model.  UPE lowers the cost of education, which is considered to be a 
part of the cost of quality.  Quality children are now less expensive and more of can 
potentially be had with the same income.  Parents’ real incomes have increased.  
Because of this parents may choose to invest in a greater quantity of children or fewer 
children of greater quality. 
Graphically this change in real income would be represented by an outward 
pivot of the budget constraint line along the X axis.  Parents would move to a higher 
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indifference curve, which may or may not change the quantity of children depending on 
income and substitution effects.  What we are ultimately concerned with in this study is 
measuring the change in quantity with a change in price (𝑑𝑁
𝑑𝑝0
). 
 A strong social safety net may lead to less demand for children.  Parents may 
view children as a future source of support in old age (Leibenstein 1975).  In countries 
with a strong old age insurance system the burden of supporting the elderly shifts from 
their children to the state, explaining one possible source of variation in fertility rates 
between the developed and developing worlds.  The growth of formal support structures 
in these countries may influence fertility rates in a noticeable manner and will be a 
consideration in model specification. 
 Beyond the intensive margin impacts (quantity of children), changes in 
education may also have an impact at the extensive margin (whether or not to have any 
children).  Based on theory, it can be expected that lowering the cost of education could 
increase the portion of women who choose to have children as women see that the cost 
of children decreases. 
 
Empirical Findings 
 The inverse correlation between development (typically represented by a 
country’s GDP per capita) and fertility (represented by the number of children per 
woman) is clearly borne out by data.  A debate concerns which direction the causality 
lies.  Does high fertility cause poverty?  Does poverty cause high fertility?  Is there 
another variable connecting the two?  These questions have been asked by researchers 
on both a micro and macro level. 
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 Brander and Dowrick (1994) find that birthrate declines precede economic 
growth increases.  Their work indicates that high birth rates are the cause of lagging 
economic growth rather than a symptom of it.  This research shows that as birth rates 
decline, the rate of income growth increases in the medium-term; the causal relationship 
goes from fertility to income. 
 Other works are more ambiguous in their findings regarding causality.  Herzer, 
Strulik, and Vollmer (2012) find that growth of income leads to a decline in fertility 
rates.  However, they are clear that causality can go both ways, as a “virtuous cycle of 
demo-economic development” occurs.   
 Recent work by Aaronson, Lange, and Mazumder (2014) found that increases in 
schooling opportunities in the United States a century ago led to decreases in intensive 
margin fertility measures and increases at the extensive margin for the cohort of 
potential mothers that were not beneficiaries of expanded education.  These two effects 
were essentially offsetting.  For women who were beneficiaries of expanded education, 
there were declines at both margins.3  Since developing countries in this current era face 
some of the demographic transitions that were occurring in the United States during the 
earlier period, a similar result may be expected to emerge. 
 
Implications 
In relatively poor nations, falling fertility rates can lessen the strain on already 
limited public resources.  A large population is also of concern because of its 
environmental impact.  More births means more people generating waste, using water,                                                         
3 The decline at the extensive measure for these younger women did not necessarily reflect a choice to 
stay childless permanently, but more likely a decision to delay motherhood. 
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and taking up space.  As countries come to value the condition of their environment and 
the global environment more, population growth will demand increased attention. 
If  UPE leads to a decrease in fertility among non-beneficiary mothers, then 
UPE can be considered as a policy to reduce fertility in a relatively rapid manner.  The 
traditional view that increasing education leads to a decrease in fertility would lead us to 
believe that UPE’s fertility benefits are relatively long run- taking at least a decade to 
begin to take hold.  Viewing UPE as changing parents’ fertility decisions based on the 
quality-quantity tradeoff would imply that the expansion of educational opportunities 
will pay much more immediate benefits than typically recognized. 
 Explicit government attempts to curtail population growth have often taken the 
form of restrictions on the ability of citizens to make personal decisions. China’s one 
child policy is the most visible and well-known of these kinds of policies.  This study 
could show an alternative method of achieving the same goals without using strong 
government coercion to limit citizens’ choices while also encouraging the growth of 
human capital in the long run. 
 
MDGs and Educational Changes 
Data indicates that countries have responded to the UPE MDG and enrollment 
rates in primary education have increased globally.  However, despite improvements, 
“progress in reducing the number children out of school has slackened considerably” 
since 2007 (UN 2014).  It appears unlikely that the UPE MDG will actually be achieved 
by the 2015 deadline.  Despite this shortcoming, the real progress that has been made in 
education still provides the opportunity for analysis.  Figure 4 shows both quantitative 
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changes since the release of the MDGs and the UN’s own qualitative measure of 
success as informed by the quantitative measures.  We can see from this that for 
developing countries, net enrollment rates were at nearly 90 percent for primary school 
age children in 2012.  This is up from 83 percent at the time of the MDG 
announcement.  The poorest performing region in this regard is Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where the enrollment rate was 78 percent in 2012.  Though this is far below the desired 
level, the region improved in this measure by 18 percentage points since the MDGs, 
compared to an increase of only 8 percentage points (52 percent to 60 percent) between 
1990 and 2000.  The UPE MDG has had an impact on schooling levels. 
Using data obtained from the World Bank’s DataBank we can observe changes 
in average education levels before and after the announcement of the MDGs.  These 
changes are shown in Figure 5 for the 30 countries that are used in the fertility response 
analysis to be conducted later in this paper.  The graphs here show changes in schooling 
for two age cohorts, 15-19 year olds and 20-24 year olds.  The 15-19 year old cohort 
can be considered treated by the MDGs.  The oldest members of that cohort (19 year 
olds) would have been primary school age in 2000 and could be beneficiaries of 
educational improvements resulting from the MDGs.  The older cohort may be partially 
treated, but we would not expect them to see the benefits of UPE to the degree of the 
younger cohort.  We see that both cohorts did broadly see rises in schooling levels 
between 2000 and 2010.  For nearly two thirds of these countries the gains in the MDG 
period (2000-2010) exceeded those in the pre-MDG period (1990-2000).  Those 
countries that had low baseline levels of education saw greater gains.  This indicates a 
closing of the schooling gap between countries with very low education levels and those 
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with higher levels.  When we compare the cohorts against each other we see that the 
closing of this gap is stronger in the younger cohort as we would expect if they are the 
main beneficiaries of UPE initiatives. 
Looking at national level data, most countries within the 30 country sample that 
is used later for analysis of fertility response saw gains in overall schooling levels 
between 2000 and 2010 for the younger UPE beneficiary cohort (Figure 5) (Barro and 
Lee 2010).  For comparison, the same measure is examined in the 10 years prior (1990-
2000).  More countries increased schooling levels during the MDG period (post-2000) 
for both age groups than in the prior period.  Those countries that had the lowest 
starting levels of education in 2000 generally saw the biggest gains and did not see 
losses.  This progress demonstrated at the national level indicates the viability of this 
research and the need for local level analysis. 
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Figure 4: UN Enrollment Data 
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Figure 5: Changes in Mean Years of Schooling by Age Group and Time Period4 
 
 
 Having demonstrated that countries have increased their schooling levels and 
that there has been some response to the MDG, we examine the factors behind 
educational improvement at a subnational level.  As detailed later, the 30 country 
sample used for fertility response analysis is subdivided into a total of 218 districts.  In 
each of these districts a measure of expected education was constructed using data from 
the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) by taking the weighted mean years of 
schooling from all 15 year olds in a given district in surveys before and after the 
announcement of the MDGs.  15 year olds were chosen for this measure because they 
would have been old enough to be beneficiaries of UPE reforms in the second survey 
period, but generally too young to have begun making fertility decisions.5  
                                                        
4 For source data, see Table A-2 in the Appendix 
5 Since the smallest gap between DHS surveys is 8 years, any 15 year old in the post-period could be 
expected to have been full treated if countries responded quickly to the MDGs.  A 15 year old in 2008 
(the earliest follow-year) would have been 7 years old and in primary school at the time the MDGs were 
released.  
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Improvement in education within a district was then measured by taking the difference 
between the later expected schooling and the pre-MDG expected schooling. 
By regressing the change in schooling between survey periods within a district 
on the initial schooling level in that district and controlling for other factors we can test 
whether or not the relatively simplistic results observed in Figure 5 hold up to stricter 
scrutiny at a subnational level.  Table 1 demonstrates that this is the case.  We find that 
for each additional year of baseline schooling, districts see a decrease in the difference 
in schooling levels (Schooling Change) of slightly less than 1 year of schooling.  This 
coefficient is highly statistically significant.  The negative effect shows that higher 
baseline levels of schooling within a district were associated with smaller gains, all else 
equal.  This result indicates the closing of the schooling gap at the district level.  This 
could be attributed to several factors.  Areas with high initial levels of schooling may 
have already been approaching UPE and this natural limit meant no possibility of real 
growth.  Also, these districts could see increasing marginal costs for each additional 
amount of schooling.  At the lower end, districts may have been totally lacking 
education and could benefit from increasing marginal returns.  Other factors, to include 
GDP, relative regional wealth6, and foreign aid (ODA), were also significant, but 
positive. 
  
                                                        
6 Relative wealth is measured using the DHS wealth index.  This measure indicates a household’s living 
standard based on factors including ownership of certain items, water access, and the construction 
materials of housing.  All of these factors are addressed by DHS survey questions.  The weighting of 
different factors varies by country, meaning that a wealth index score reflects the living standard of a 
household compared to households in the same country. 
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Table 1: Educational Improvement Factors 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Schooling Change Schooling Change Schooling Change 
Initial Expected 
Schooling 
-0.729*** -0.530*** -0.875*** 
 (0.0693) (0.0587) (0.0574) 
    
Years Between Surveys -0.744*** 0.0307 -1.221*** 
 (0.202) (0.0297) (0.285) 
    
Log(Per Capita GDP)  0.700*** 0.853*** 
  (0.149) (0.207) 
    
High ODA Recipient  0.553*** 0.991*** 
  (0.125) (0.150) 
    
Wealth Index   0.973*** 
   (0.183) 
    
Urban   0.376 
   (0.335) 
    
    
Country Fixed Effects Yes No Yes 
Observations 218 218 218 
Adjusted R2 0.702 0.504 0.810 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard errors clustered by region 
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METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW  
Statistical Techniques  
The primary quantitative technique that is used to examine the relationship 
between UPE and fertility in this research is regression analysis.  This technique seeks 
to explain movements in one variable (dependent variable) as a function of the 
movements of other variables (independent variables).  This is quantified in a single 
equation.  A simple linear regression with a single independent variable could be 
represented as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑙 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑙 + 𝑢𝑖 
 
In this equation Yitl is the ith observation of the dependent variable at time t in 
location l and Xitl is the ith observation of the independent variable at time t in location l.  
β0 is a constant, or intercept, within the model.  β1 is the parameter which tells how Yitl 
is influenced by Xitl.  ui is a disturbance term that recognizes that Yitl is not perfectly 
explained by Xitl. 
Econometric Strategy 
The data used for this study is repeated cross-sectional information on women’s 
fertility, as measured by total children ever born and births in the previous five years.  
Details on the dataset and its sources are explained later.   To measure the average 
effect of expected schooling in a district on fertility rates data cells were constructed 
based on cohorts of women in region r of country c at time t.  Because there are 218 
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regions in dataset, this meant the creation of 436 cells.  Once this was constructed, cells 
were weighted according to size and the following equation was estimated using 
ordinary least squares (OLS): 
(1) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡) =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑟𝑐𝑡+ 𝑎𝑟+ 𝑎𝑡+ 𝑎𝑡−𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
In this equation and those that follow, the outcome variable Fertility can 
represent two measures.  The first is the total number of children ever born to a woman.  
This provides us with a measure of long-term fertility.  The second measure is the total 
number of times a woman has given birth in the last five years.  This provides us with a 
relatively short-term measure of fertility.  We include this because we would expect it 
to be more responsive to recent changes in the independent variables.  In all regressions 
we take the log of these fertility measures so that coefficients can be interpreted as 
having a percent change effect on fertility rather than changing fertility in levels.  The 
variable log(Fertilityrct) represents the log of the particular fertility measure for women 
in a given cohort.  The variable ExpSchoolingrct represents the expected schooling level 
for children in a given cohort.  The construction of the measure is described above. Xrct 
represents time varying national and demographic controls. The set of national level 
controls includes the log of per capita GDP, the portion of the population that is 
working, and the portion of GDP that government spending accounts for.  All of these 
measures are for country c at time t.  The demographic controls include the average age, 
average years of schooling, portion of urban residents, and portion of married 
respondents for women in region r at time t.  By controlling for schooling here, it is 
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possible to separate the effects of a woman’s own education on her fertility choices 
from the effects of the expected education that her child will be receiving.  ar represents 
region fixed effects.  at represents year fixed effects.  at-s represents fixed effects for the 
time between time t and the initial survey year s.  This has been included since the gap 
between DHS survey years in the sample varies.  For cells in the initial survey year t – s 
will equal 0, for all other cells the value is between 8 and 16.   
The coefficient of interest is β1, which estimates the impact of an additional year 
of expected schooling in a region on the fertility rate in that region in percentage change 
terms.  A positive β1 would indicate that increasing schooling by an additional year is 
associated with an increase in the total fertility rate in that region.  A negative β1 -
coefficient would indicate an inverse relationship between regional expected schooling 
levels and fertility rates. 
 The above regression only takes into account differences between women in 
different regions.  However, it can be expected that regional differences are not all that 
we should consider in constructing cells.  Different age groups would likely respond 
differently to expected schooling levels in their regions.  For this reason age cohorts 
were used to create cells in a manner consistent with that used to obtain average effects 
above.  Women were placed in age cohorts based in five year intervals starting with 20-
24 year olds and going up to 45-49 year olds.  Thus, cells contained all women in age 
group g in region r in country c at time t.  This created 2180 cells of various sizes.  Cells 
were weighted according to size and the following equation were then estimated using 
OLS: 
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(2) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑔=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑔+ 𝑎𝑟+ 𝑎𝑡+ 𝑎𝑡−𝑠+ 𝑎𝑔 + �𝛽𝑔(𝑎𝑔 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑐𝑡)
𝑔
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
 The outcome variables and national level controls are the same as above.  ag 
represents age group fixed effects.  Because this is included, age is dropped from the 
demographic controls.  Age group fixed effects are also interacted with expected 
schooling levels.  This model will indicate whether different age groups actually do 
respond differently to the expected schooling level in their district.  For each age group, 
other than a reference group, we are given a coefficient 𝛽𝑔.  That coefficient is then 
added to the coefficient β1 to give us the overall effect of expected schooling on a 
particular age group.  For the reference group, β1 is this estimated effect (we could also 
think of this as 𝛽𝑔 equaling zero for the reference group.  For the estimates in this study, 
the reference group is the youngest cohort.   
 Just as age groups would be expected to respond to schooling differently, effects 
could be expected to vary with education cohorts.  Women were divided in three 
terciles based on their years of schooling.  This created a low education cohort, a 
medium education cohort, and a high education cohort.  Cells based on these three 
groups were then created for each region r in each country c in time t.  There were 1308 
cells created by this. Cells were weighted according to size and the following equations 
were then estimated using OLS for each educational tercile e: 
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(3) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑒 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑒+ 𝑎𝑟+ 𝑎𝑡+ 𝑎𝑡−𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
 In addition to this, a similar model was constructed to analyze all three terciles 
together: 
 
(4) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑒=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑒+ 𝑎𝑟+ 𝑎𝑡+ 𝑎𝑡−𝑠+ 𝑎𝑒 + �𝛽𝑒(𝑎𝑒 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑐𝑡)
𝑒
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
The outcome variables and national level controls remain the same as above.  ae 
represents educational cohort fixed effects.  Because this is included, schooling is 
dropped from the demographic controls.  Age is included with demographic controls.  
Education cohorts are also interacted with expected schooling levels.  Like the age 
cohorts model, we will add the 𝛽𝑒 coefficients to β1 and this will be interpreted as the 
effect of expected schooling on that cohort e.   The reference group in this model is the 
low education cohort. This model will indicate whether different educational groups 
respond differently to the expected schooling level in their district. 
 Finally, to best separate out the impacts of own schooling and regional expected 
schooling on fertility, cells of women are constructed based on age group and education 
cohort.  Thus a cell now contains women of the same age group, educational level, 
region, and time period.  We estimate the following model: 
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(5) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐹𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑔𝑒 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑋𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑔𝑒+ 𝑎𝑟+ 𝑎𝑡+ 𝑎𝑡−𝑠+ 𝑎𝑔+ 𝑎𝑒 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
  
This model includes both age group and education cohort fixed effects.  The 
model remains similar to the above ones, though it should be our most powerful model 
for estimating the impact of expected schooling net of variation in age and education 
profile.  Recognizing that older women in our sample may be outside of their peak 
fertility years, we consider only the youngest two age cohorts (20-24 year olds and 25-
29 year olds) for our measure of short-term fertility in this model. 
 The regressions thus far have addressed changes at the intensive margins of 
fertility.  The extensive margin is also of interest (Aaronson et al 2014).  The cells 
constructed above based on educational cohort, age group, region, and time period are 
used in this analysis.  The following equation is estimated: 
 
(6) 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑔𝑒 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑔𝑒+ 𝑎𝑟+ 𝑎𝑡+ 𝑎𝑡−𝑠+ 𝑎𝑟+ 𝑎𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
 This regression is run separately for women between ages 20 and 29 and those 
between ages 30 and 49.  It is assumed that the younger women are in their peak years 
for fertility decisions.  Older women would have already made fertility decisions at the 
extensive margin that would not be responding to UPE.  The outcome variable 
EverGivenBirthrctge is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 if a woman has ever given 
birth and 0 otherwise.  When aggregated, it represents the portion of women within a 
cohort that have ever given birth.  The β1 coefficient can be interpreted as signifying the 
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percent increase in the likelihood of ever having given birth following a one year 
increase in the expected schooling level in a region. The β1 coefficient will be positive if 
more women have any children in response to higher expected schooling in their region.  
If the coefficient is negative it will indicate that more women choose not to have any 
children in response to increased schooling in their region.  A negative coefficient 
should be interpreted as indicating possibly delaying fertility decisions and not simply 
choosing to never have children. 
Data  
DHS are surveys conducted approximately once every five years in various 
developing countries.  The DHS program is sponsored by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and implemented by agencies within the countries 
where surveys are being conducted.  The sample size is typically between 5,000 and 
30,000 households.  Interview subjects are surveyed on a variety issues, including 
fertility, education, health indicators, women’s empowerment, and more.  A standard set 
of questions is asked in every participating country.  A smaller set of country-specific 
questions are also asked in each country. 
 This survey is particularly useful for conducting this research because of its 
large sample size, coverage of relevant issues, and the large amount of historical data.  
The survey includes data on both the fertility figures and education figures that are 
necessary to examine the relationship between fertility rates and educational access. 
 Much of this research examines variables at a regional level.  The DHS is 
statistically representative at the district (or equivalent) level and variables in the 
fertility response analysis are aggregated at this level.  In many cases, the way in which 
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the DHS structured districts changed between surveys.  When this occurs, only districts 
that exist in both datasets are included. 
 When surveys are conducted across two years, as was the case for several 
surveys, the survey was treated as having been conducted in a single year.  The choice 
of year for this was whichever of the two possible years the majority of respondents had 
been surveyed in.  This was done to simplify the aggregation of data. 
 A shortcoming of the DHS surveys is that they lack specific information about 
local education infrastructure.  While the surveys reveal a great deal about individual 
education levels, they are not strong indicators of whether or not individuals have 
access to educational facilities.     
To address some of the drawback of DHS data, country level data from the Penn 
World Table (PWT) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) was utilized.  PWT includes measures of national income accounts in real 
purchasing power parity (PPP) terms over several decades for all countries in this 
sample.  Using PWT, national level comparisons can be made across both time and 
space in common terms.  Further, PWT contains information on employment levels 
within countries, a potentially useful control.  The OECD compiles measures of official 
development assistance (ODA), a measure of foreign aid.  Aid may be given to support 
educational programs in these developing countries and ODA measures were included 
in the earlier analysis of regional education level changes. 
 National educational improvements were measured using the Barro-Lee 
educational dataset.  This was used to measure gains at a national level between 1990 
and 2010.  This provides a quick measure of educational changes and the efficacy of 
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any educational reforms.  The second aspect of this research, how women respond to 
education changes, hinges in part on the expectation that there is some variation in 
education levels and that improvements have occurred.  Barro-Lee data was unavailable 
for certain countries.  In these instances data from the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis/ Vienna Institute of Demography (IIASA/VID) Projections was used.  
Actual measures of schooling in 1990 and 2000 and projections of 2010 were used from 
this. 
 
Country Selection and Dataset Construction 
 Countries were considered for the sample if a standard DHS survey was taken 
between 1996 and 2000 as well as after 2008, as provides a sufficient time period for 
countries to respond to the MDGs and implement reforms.  Countries that met this DHS 
criteria were included in the sample if relevant country-level data was available from 
PWT 8.0 and the OECD statistical database.  Based on this criteria, the sample consists 
of 30 developing countries.  The list of countries in the sample is contained in Table A-
1 in the appendix. 
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FERTILITY RESPONSE RESULTS 
Average Effects 
 We can view the average effect of expected schooling on fertility in 
Table 2.  The columns in this table represent regressions run with increasingly stringent 
sets of controls as you move from left to right across the table.  Columns 1 through 4 
show results when the log of total children ever born to a woman is used as the outcome 
variable.  Columns 5 through 8 replace the log of total children ever born with the log of 
children born in the last five years as the outcome variable.  
Column 1 is run with only expected schooling as an explanatory variable.  Year, 
measurement gap, and country fixed effects are included in this model.  We see that 
expected schooling is highly statistically significant and negative.   
In column 2 region fixed effects replace country fixed effects in the model.  No 
new controls are added.  Expected schooling is still highly significant and negative, but 
the coefficient is smaller than before. 
Column 3 adds in national level controls while maintaining region fixed effects 
as in column 2.  We see that the coefficient on expected schooling becomes slightly 
more negative and stays highly significant. 
Demographic controls are added into the equation in column 4.  Now that these 
controls are included, expected schooling is not statistically significant.  This large 
change in the coefficient suggests collinearity between changes in expected schooling 
and overall changes characteristics of women. 
Columns 5 through 8 demonstrate similar results when the outcome variable is 
changed to the log of children born in the last five years.  Whether fertility is measured 
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by total children ever born or births in the last five years, we see no statistically 
significant result for expected schooling levels when controlling for demographic 
characteristics (columns 4 and 8). 
 
Age Cohort Effects 
 Though we have observed that the average effect of expected schooling on 
fertility is insignificant, we can expect that different age cohorts will respond differently 
and such analysis may be more informative.  Age cohort effects are displayed in Table 
3.  To preserve space, this table only includes models run with the most stringent set of 
controls as established in Table 2 (region fixed effects, national controls, demographic 
controls).  Thus, columns 1 and 2 correspond most closely to column 4 in Table 2.  The 
difference between columns 1 and 2 is the inclusion of interaction terms.  The reference 
group for this table is the 20-25 year old age group of women. 
 Column 1 considers the fertility rate as measured by total births and contains 
only group dummies for age cohorts.  We see a statistically significant result here for 
expected schooling.  In this model, an additional year of expected schooling in a region 
leads to a 2.6 percent decrease in total fertility.  When the model is expanded to include 
interactions between age groups and expected schooling we find that the expected 
schooling variable is no longer significant (column 2).  However, each interaction term 
is significant and negative. 
 It may be that the expected schooling coefficient in column 2 is insignificant 
because of collinearity between education and expected schooling for the reference 
group.  Because this is the youngest group included in these estimations and the 
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structure of this data, some of the women in this age group may have been beneficiaries 
of education and so their own schooling reflects the expected schooling to some degree. 
 Columns 3 and 4 show the results for this same model, but using births in the 
last five years as the outcome variable.  When only age group dummies are included, 
the expected schooling effect on short-term fertility is stronger than on total fertility 
(column 3). 
 
Education Cohort Effects 
 Knowing that a woman’s own education has a very large impact on fertility 
decisions, we can view educational cohort effects in Table 4.  Educational cohorts’ total 
fertility responses are estimated separately from each other in columns 1, 2, and 3. 
Column 4 contains the results when regressions are run using all three educational 
cohorts and includes interaction terms for education cohorts and expected schooling.  In 
column 4 the reference group is the low education cohort of women. As before, only 
results using the stringent set of controls are included.  
We see that response to expected schooling varies between these cohorts.  The 
low education group sees a 1.9 percent decrease in fertility for each additional year of 
expected schooling.  The medium education cohort does not have a statistically 
significant response.  The response for the high education cohort is a 3 percent decrease.  
The demographic controls for each group are highly significant. 
 When all three cohorts are measured together the value of the expected 
schooling variable is no longer significant.  The reference group for this regression is 
the low education cohort.  Though expected schooling was statistically significant for 
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the low education cohort when run in isolation, this coefficient is insignificant when all 
three groups are run together with the low education cohort as the reference group.  This 
change comes from the coefficient becoming closer to zero while the standard errors 
remain essentially the same.  In this same regression we that the effects of expected 
schooling are stronger for both the medium and high education groups, though the 
interaction term is only significant for the medium education cohort. 
 
Age Education Cohort Effects  
 Considering that controlling for both educational and age cohort effects appears 
important, we combine the two to create cohorts based on age and education.  The 
results of this are given in Table 5 and provide us with the strongest results.  Here we 
can observe the effect of expected schooling net of any intraregional differences in 
education and age.  We can interpret the coefficient on expected schooling as providing 
us with the average effect of expected schooling levels in a region for women a 
particular age and education cohort. 
 For this table, we again move from least controlled to most controlled model as 
we move from left to right across the table.  We initially run the model with no country 
or region fixed effects (columns 1 and 6), then run two models using either of these 
(columns 2, 3, 7, and 8), then run a model with region fixed effects and national level 
controls (columns 4 and 9), and finally run our most controlled model by including 
demographic controls (columns 5 and 10). 
 There is a 2.9 percent decrease in total fertility for each additional year of 
regional expected schooling (column 5).  This effect is highly statistically significant.  
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This tells us that net of any variation in education and age profile within a particular 
region, we can expect a 2.9 percent decrease in the total fertility rate of a region when 
expected schooling increases by one year in that region. 
 We see a similar result in column 8 which measures births in the previous five 
years for women aged 20-29.  An additional year of expected schooling here leads to a 
decrease of 2.6 percent in the short-term fertility measure and is statistically significant. 
 These results allow us to conclude that regional expected schooling does in fact 
have a negative relationship with fertility.  Women choose quality children over 
quantity of children as educational opportunities increase for their children. 
  
Extensive Margin Effects 
 Table 6 contains results for the analysis of extensive margin effects.  The cells 
here are constructed the same as in Table 5.  We are utilizing this structure because, as 
demonstrated above, it appears to be the best way of determining the effect of expected 
schooling on our variables of interest.  We are most interested in the results for our 
younger cohort because they are most likely to be in their peak fertility years.  The 
younger group cohort (columns 1 through 4) are in the age range when they are most 
likely to be potentially engaging in childbearing for the first time.  For both of our age 
cohorts in this table we run regressions ranging from least controlled to most stringently 
controlled. 
We find that for our younger cohort (20-29 year olds) there is a very small 
inverse relationship between expected schooling levels and having any children 
(column 4).  A slightly less than 1 percent decrease in the portion of young women to 
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have ever given birth occurs when expected schooling in a region increases by one year. 
Viewing column 8 we see that this effect totally disappears in the older cohort (30-49 
year olds).  The suggestion here is that some younger women may choose to delay 
giving birth when expected schooling levels are high, but this effect is largely 
dominated by other effects and the practical significance is relatively low. 
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 Table 2: Average Effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 log(Total Kids) log(Five Year Births) 
Expected  -0.128*** -0.0786*** -0.0806*** -0.00148 -0.140*** -0.0767*** -0.0768*** -0.0182 
Schooling (0.0136) (0.0132) (0.0151) (0.00980) (0.0180) (0.0131) (0.0158) (0.0114) 
         
Log(Per Capita    0.00773 -0.135**   -0.0138 -0.207*** 
GDP)   (0.103) (0.0580)   (0.111) (0.0760) 
         
Employment 
Level 
  0.0614 -0.414   -0.413 -0.737* 
   (0.465) (0.302)   (0.562) (0.446) 
         
Government    0.485 0.489**   0.750* 0.687** 
Spending 
Portion 
  (0.362) (0.211)   (0.386) (0.293) 
         
Age    0.0512***    -0.0359** 
    (0.00933)    (0.0139) 
         
Urban    -0.122**    -0.105 
    (0.0552)    (0.0713) 
         
Years of 
Education 
   -0.0511***    -0.0661*** 
    (0.0140)    (0.0161) 
         
Ever Married    0.948***    0.828** 
    (0.243)    (0.325) 
         
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Measure Gap 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Region FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
         
Country FE Yes No No No Yes No No No 
Observations 450515 450515 450515 450515 450515 450515 450515 450515 
Cells 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 
Adjusted R2 0.811 0.941 0.942 0.979 0.884 0.968 0.969 0.980 
Standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors clustered at regional level 
Cells constructed using region and time period 
Cells frequency weighted 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3: Age Cohort Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 log(Total Kids) log(Five Year Births) 
Expected Schooling -0.0250*** 0.00792 -0.0567*** 0.0639*** 
 (0.00856) (0.0110) (0.0203) (0.0195) 
     
Urban -0.199*** -0.140*** -0.780*** -0.425*** 
 (0.0469) (0.0455) (0.123) (0.102) 
     
Years of Education -0.0290*** -0.0397*** 0.0734*** -0.00658 
 (0.00666) (0.00662) (0.0270) (0.0238) 
     
Ever Married 1.167*** 1.301*** 1.024*** 1.547*** 
 (0.0997) (0.106) (0.242) (0.237) 
     
25-29 0.500*** 0.588*** 0.0459 0.0865*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0181) (0.0357) (0.0293) 
     
30-34 0.812*** 0.990*** -0.148*** 0.104** 
 (0.0182) (0.0266) (0.0502) (0.0400) 
     
35-39 1.014*** 1.215*** -0.478*** 0.0359 
 (0.0215) (0.0329) (0.0633) (0.0564) 
     
40-44 1.134*** 1.368*** -1.106*** -0.266*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0377) (0.0752) (0.0805) 
     
45-49 1.203*** 1.408*** -2.256*** -0.938*** 
 (0.0255) (0.0395) (0.0966) (0.108) 
     
25-29 * Exp Schooling  -0.0204***  -0.0293*** 
  (0.00393)  (0.00720) 
     
30-34 * Exp Schooling  -0.0380***  -0.0780*** 
  (0.00684)  (0.0123) 
     
35-39 * Exp Schooling  -0.0434***  -0.133*** 
  (0.00870)  (0.0172) 
     
40-44 * Exp Schooling  -0.0497***  -0.194*** 
  (0.0100)  (0.0220) 
     
45-49 * Exp Schooling  -0.0459***  -0.283*** 
  (0.0101)  (0.0255) 
     
National Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Measurement Gap FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 450515 450515 448711 448711 
Cells 1308 1308 1308 1308 
Adjusted R2 0.975 0.978 0.887 0.919 
Standard errors in parentheses, Standard errors clustered at regional level 
Cells constructed using region, time period, and age group 
Cells frequency weighted 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4: Education Cohort Effects
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Table 5: Education/Age Cohort Effects 
Table 6: Extensive Margin Effects 
 20-29 Year Olds 30-49 Year Olds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Ever Given Birth Ever Given Birth 
Expected  -0.0538*** -0.0329*** -0.0401*** -0.0072* -
0.0108*** 
-0.0062*** -0.0081*** -0.0017 
Schooling (0.00713) (0.00744) (0.00791) (0.0041) (0.00237) (0.00197) (0.00243) (0.0017) 
         
Urban    -0.0247*    -0.0159*** 
    (0.0137)    (0.0047) 
         
Ever Married    0.763***    0.735*** 
    (0.0162)    (0.0317) 
         
National Level 
Controls 
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
         
Education 
Cohort FE 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
         
Age Group FE No No No Yes No No No Yes 
         
Measurement 
Gap FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Region FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
         
Country FE Yes No No No Yes No No No 
Observations 192175 192175 192175 192175 274382 274382 274382 274382 
Cells 1308 1308 1308 1308 2616 2616 2616 2616 
Adjusted R2 0.338 0.392 0.394 0.950 0.236 0.310 0.311 0.692 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Standard errors clustered at regional level 
Cells constructed using region, time period, age group, and education cohort 
Cells frequency weighted 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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DISCUSSION 
The results of this research demonstrate that local schooling levels do have some 
impact on fertility decisions for women in developing countries.  At the intensive 
margin we see that, controlling for their schooling and age, women have fewer children 
in both the short- and long-term as schooling levels in their regions increase.  This 
provides an empirical response to theoretical ambiguity generated by the Becker and 
Lewis model. 
As educational opportunities expand through measures like UPE, the cost of 
quality of children decreases and we observe a decrease in fertility at the intensive 
margin.  Quality rises and quantity decreases.  At the individual level, this indicates that 
this smaller group of children should receive more education and can expect greater 
returns in terms of future income than they would otherwise have.  These enhanced 
returns to the child’s income make increased investment in quality, especially if 
discounted through UPE, the rational choice for parents who expect their children to 
serve as old age insurance.  
The characteristics of individual women play a larger role in their fertility 
decisions than schooling levels.  This is not a surprise.  We should expect that women 
would be more influenced by their own education and age than by educational 
opportunities of their children.  Still, to find that those opportunities can play some role 
in decision making is a valuable insight.  Improving educational opportunities affects 
outcomes for both beneficiaries (children) and the broader community (mothers).  The 
average annual change in expected schooling for our 218 districts was a gain of 0.11 
years of schooling.  This means that over the period of a decade the value of expected 
 
 
38  
schooling in the average district increased by slightly over 1 year.  All else equal, we 
would expect the average district to see a drop in fertility of more than 3 percent in 
response to this.  In the initial survey period, the mean number of children ever born to 
woman was 2.97.  In the follow-up period, this value was 2.51 children per woman, a 
drop of 15.5 percent.  Improvements in educational opportunities and a shift towards 
quality preference may explain much of this change. 
The extensive margin effect findings are not completely consistent with other 
studies of fertility at the extensive margin.  Aaronson et al. (2014) found that for older 
women, the expansion of educational opportunities led to an increase of fertility at the 
extensive margin.  For younger women, they found a result similar to that in this study.  
The inconsistency between that research and this research may arise because older 
women in high fertility developing countries are not responding to schooling so much 
as to other more immediate factors, such as economic conditions, health infrastructure, 
and cultural norms that diverge from those affecting women in the United States and 
other developed countries.  Still, these results indicate that with a one year increase in 
regional expected schooling we can expect seven women out of 1000 in peak child 
bearing years to choose not to have children when they otherwise would.  It should also 
be noted that while extensive fertility rates in the 30 country sample are high compared 
to developed countries, out of a sample of over 250,000 individuals, 25 percent of 
women in the younger cohort were childless.  This rate of childlessness is higher than 
might be expected.  For the older cohort, the childlessness rate is only 7.3 percent.  By 
not engaging in motherhood at a young age, women can instead potentially enhance 
their human capital through education or participate in the labor force.  These decisions 
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can contribute to female empowerment in areas where opportunities are traditionally 
limited for women. 
One criticism of efforts to increase schooling levels is that while schooling 
levels are increasing, the benefits are overstated (Pritchett 2013).  Simply being enrolled 
is does not mean that students are learning valuable skills.  This research provides one 
possible counter to that argument.  Even if increased schooling in developing countries 
is not benefitting students to the degree desired, schooling gains provide other benefits.  
Countries faced with high fertility rates can lessen the burdens of high fertility through 
expanded education.  
 Though expected schooling is insignificant in the average effects, we do 
observe other interesting results.  The national employment to population ratio 
coefficient is highly significant and negative for births in the last five years, but 
insignificant for total births.  This suggests that in the short-term fertility rates are 
highly responsive to national employment conditions.  We might expect this as women 
find that increased labor opportunities increase the opportunity cost of child rearing and 
choose to delay having children in order to engage in work.  That the total births 
response to this is insignificant may show that temporal labor conditions do not carry 
over permanently to fertility decisions and is in keeping with the idea that current labor 
conditions merely affect the timing of fertility decisions.  Whether these results carry 
over to a more robust test of these effects is worth evaluation.  The relationship between 
unemployment levels, fertility, and health outcomes has been examined in developed 
countries.  This research has indicated that credit constraints are a factor that lead to 
fertility decreasing as unemployment rises, but for women with increased access to 
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credit fertility rises with unemployment rates (Dehejia and Lleras-Muney 2004).  The 
relationship observed with our DHS data is in keeping with this result.  This probably 
reflects, in part, the poor state of credit markets in the developing world. 
This study does encounter limitations with regards to causal interpretations of 
the results.  Though we can say that there is an inverse correlation between regional 
schooling opportunities and fertility in developing countries, there are several omitted 
variables that could influence this.  It could be that improvements in health 
infrastructure accompany increases in schooling and that these lead to the reduction in 
fertility that we observe.  If educational gains are accompanied by healthcare gains that 
lead to decreases in childhood mortality, it could be that some of the effect we are 
observing is actually parents responding to better healthcare outcomes for the children.  
Employing a quantity-quality model, a decrease in childhood mortality decreases the 
expected cost of surviving children (Barro and Becker 1989).  If this effect is strong and 
the change in mortality is relatively large, it could overstate the estimated effect of 
regional expected schooling.  Similarly, decreases could be driven by increased access 
to contraception.  Expanded schooling may be accompanied both by increased physical 
access to contraception and by increased effectiveness if proper techniques are being 
taught.  Such effects are difficult to determine with the datasets that were used to 
conduct this study, especially in consideration of its scope.  Further study of this issue 
could focus on specific countries for which these variables could be effectively 
monitored and controlled for. 
Another complication to this may come from the measure of expected schooling.  
The measure that was constructed here is relatively simplistic.  By taking the mean 
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schooling level of 15 year olds we may overlook rapid gains in schooling that are 
occurring contemporaneously at the primary level.  As these 15 year olds are not 
beneficiaries, this measure would not reflect such a change, though potential mothers 
could still observe and respond to it.  The likelihood of this being a significant issue in 
this study, particularly considering that the sample consists of 218 districts in 30 
countries, is small.  Strong pushes for education could have occurred in a few countries 
or districts, but would be insignificant in the larger context. 
Despite these limitations, the results uncovered here appear reasonable and 
could be expected to hold up if more controls are introduced.  As demonstrated, the 
variables with the strongest impact on fertility were individual characteristics.  The 
introduction of further regional controls may only have a small impact on the estimated 
effect of expected schooling.  The idiosyncrasies of policies in particular countries or 
regions should have minimal effect on the results with the inclusion of fixed effects in 
the model.  However, further examination of specific cases is worthwhile to establish 
what practices are most effective with regards to both increasing education and inducing 
a fertility response.  While this work establishes that a connection between the two 
exists, further research can strengthen our understanding of this connection. 
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Table A-1: Sample Countries 
Country Initial  Year Follow Up Year Years Between Surveys 
Armenia 2000 2010 10 
Bangladesh 1999 2011 12 
Benin 1996 2012 16 
Bolivia 1998 2008 10 
Burkina Faso 1999 2010 11 
Cambodia 2000 2010 10 
Cameroon 1998 2011 13 
Colombia 2000 2010 10 
Comoros 1996 2012 16 
Cote d'Ivoire 1999 2012 13 
Dominican Rep. 1999 2013 14 
Egypt 2000 2008 8 
Ethiopia 2000 2011 11 
Gabon 2000 2012 12 
Ghana 1998 2008 10 
Guinea 1999 2012 13 
Indonesia 1997 2012 15 
Jordan 1997 2012 15 
Kenya 1998 2008 10 
Madagascar 1997 2009 12 
Malawi 2000 2010 10 
Mali 1996 2012 16 
Mozambique 1997 2011 14 
Nepal 1996 2011 15 
Niger 1998 2012 14 
Philippines 1998 2013 15 
Rwanda 2000 2010 10 
Tanzania 1999 2010 11 
Uganda 2000 2011 11 
Zimbabwe 1999 2010 11 
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Table A-2: Mean Years of Schooling 
 15-19 Year Olds 20-24 Year Olds 
Country 1990 2000 2010 90-00 Δ 00-10 Δ Δ2-Δ1 1990 2000 2010 90-00 Δ 00-10 Δ Δ2-Δ1 
Armenia 10.47 8.75 9.47 -1.72 0.72 2.44 12.42 10.05 10.87 -2.37 0.82 3.19 
Bangladesh 3.61 7.01 8.21 3.40 1.20 -2.20 3.78 6.09 8.58 2.31 2.49 0.18 
Benin 3.02 4.36 6.87 1.34 2.51 1.17 3.45 3.97 5.74 0.52 1.77 1.25 
Bolivia 9.17 9.98 7.75 0.81 -2.23 -3.04 9.33 10.31 10.82 0.98 0.51 -0.47 
Burkina Faso * 1.88 2.72 3.63 0.85 0.90 0.06 1.88 2.72 3.63 0.84 0.90 0.06 
Cambodia 3.97 4.11 5.67 0.14 1.56 1.42 3.84 3.98 6.30 0.14 2.32 2.18 
Cameroon 5.83 5.85 6.01 0.02 0.16 0.14 6.48 7.41 6.85 0.93 -0.56 -1.49 
Colombia 6.63 7.30 9.95 0.67 2.65 1.98 7.43 8.41 10.86 0.98 2.45 1.47 
Comoros * 4.73 5.46 6.26 0.73 0.80 0.06 5.47 6.36 7.50 0.90 1.13 0.24 
Cote d'Ivoire 4.39 4.59 5.08 0.20 0.49 0.29 3.53 5.47 5.93 1.94 0.46 -1.48 
Dominican R. 7.04 8.47 7.87 1.43 -0.60 -2.03 7.68 8.96 9.52 1.28 0.56 -0.72 
Egypt 6.46 8.44 7.95 1.98 -0.49 -2.47 6.22 8.70 8.86 2.48 0.16 -2.32 
Ethiopia * 2.10 1.93 2.72 -0.17 0.79 0.96 1.59 2.48 3.01 0.89 0.53 -0.36 
Gabon 6.61 8.35 9.70 1.74 1.35 -0.39 8.29 9.12 10.16 0.83 1.04 0.21 
Ghana 6.84 6.53 8.11 -0.31 1.58 1.89 7.53 6.92 8.67 -0.61 1.75 2.36 
Guinea * 1.90 3.15 3.96 1.25 0.80 -0.44 2.64 3.28 4.35 0.63 1.08 0.44 
Indonesia 6.02 5.51 8.24 -0.51 2.73 3.24 6.45 6.86 9.47 0.41 2.61 2.20 
Jordan 8.09 9.02 9.87 0.93 0.85 -0.08 9.29 10.37 11.13 1.08 0.76 -0.32 
Kenya 6.01 5.50 4.48 -0.51 -1.02 -0.51 7.11 7.20 7.63 0.09 0.43 0.34 
Madagascar * 5.00 4.95 5.84 -0.05 0.89 0.95 5.77 5.13 6.01 -0.65 0.88 1.53 
Malawi 3.59 4.22 4.55 0.63 0.33 -0.30 4.25 4.42 6.76 0.17 2.34 2.17 
Mali 1.05 1.61 3.14 0.56 1.53 0.97 1.40 1.51 2.57 0.11 1.06 0.95 
Mozambique 1.38 1.05 3.76 -0.33 2.71 3.04 1.21 1.80 2.26 0.59 0.46 -0.13 
Nepal 3.28 4.12 6.24 0.84 2.12 1.28 3.65 4.28 5.96 0.63 1.68 1.05 
Niger 1.72 1.78 2.90 0.06 1.12 1.06 1.51 1.93 2.22 0.42 0.29 -0.13 
Philippines 7.57 8.04 8.76 0.47 0.72 0.25 8.47 9.07 9.47 0.60 0.40 -0.20 
Rwanda 3.22 5.12 5.80 1.90 0.68 -1.22 2.51 4.65 5.66 2.14 1.01 -1.13 
Tanzania 4.34 4.61 7.08 0.27 2.47 2.20 5.69 5.54 6.82 -0.15 1.28 1.43 
Uganda 4.68 4.90 5.40 0.22 0.50 0.28 4.98 5.36 6.98 0.38 1.62 1.24 
Zimbabwe 7.01 8.50 7.70 1.49 -0.80 -2.29 8.27 9.03 8.71 0.76 -0.32 -1.08 
 
Source: Barro-Lee (IIASA/VID if * next to country name) 
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Table A-3: Millennium Development Goals, Targets, and Indicators 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
Goals and Targets 
  (from the Millennium Declaration) Indicators for monitoring progress 
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
Target 1.A: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less 
than one dollar a day 
1.1 Proportion of population below $1.25 (PPP) per 
day7 
1.2 Poverty gap ratio  
1.3 Share of poorest quintile in national consumption 
Target 1.B: Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including 
women and young people 
 
1.4 Growth rate of GDP per person employed 
1.5 Employment-to-population ratio 
1.6 Proportion of employed people living below 
$1.25 (PPP) per day 
1.7 Proportion of own-account and contributing 
family workers in total employment  
Target 1.C: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people who suffer from hunger 
1.8 Prevalence of underweight children under-five 
years of age 
1.9 Proportion of population below minimum level of 
dietary energy consumption 
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education 
Target 2.A: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to 
complete a full course of primary schooling 
2.1 Net enrolment ratio in primary education 
2.2 Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach 
last grade of  primary  
2.3 Literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds, women and 
men 
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women 
Target 3.A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 
2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015 
3.1 Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and 
tertiary education 
3.2 Share of women in wage employment in the 
non-agricultural sector 
3.3 Proportion of seats held by women in national 
parliament 
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality  
Target 4.A: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate 
  
4.1 Under-five mortality rate 
4.2 Infant mortality rate 
4.3 Proportion of 1 year-old children immunised 
against measles 
Goal 5: Improve maternal health  
Target 5.A: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality 
ratio 
5.1 Maternal mortality ratio 
5.2 Proportion of births attended by skilled health 
personnel  
Target 5.B: Achieve, by 2015, universal access to reproductive health 
 
5.3 Contraceptive prevalence rate  
5.4 Adolescent birth rate 
5.5 Antenatal care coverage (at least one visit and 
at least four visits) 
5.6 Unmet need for family planning  
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
Target 6.A: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS 
  
  
  
  
6.1 HIV prevalence among population aged 15-24 
years  
6.2 Condom use at last high-risk sex 
6.3 Proportion of population aged 15-24 years with 
comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS 
6.4 Ratio of school attendance of orphans to school 
attendance of non-orphans aged 10-14 years                                                         
7 For monitoring country poverty trends, indicators based on national poverty lines should be used, where available. 
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Target 6.B: Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who 
need it 
6.5 Proportion of population with advanced HIV 
infection with access to antiretroviral drugs 
Target 6.C: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other 
major diseases 
  
  
  
  
6.6 Incidence and death rates associated with 
malaria 
6.7 Proportion of children under 5 sleeping under 
insecticide-treated bednets 
6.8 Proportion of children under 5 with fever who are 
treated with appropriate anti-malarial drugs 
6.9 Incidence, prevalence and death rates 
associated with tuberculosis 
6.10 Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and 
cured under directly observed treatment  short 
course  
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability 
Target 7.A: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and 
programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources 
  
   
Target 7.B: Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving,  by 2010, a significant reduction in the 
rate of loss 
7.1 Proportion of land area covered by forest 
7.2 CO2 emissions, total, per capita and per $1 
GDP (PPP) 
7.3 Consumption of ozone-depleting substances 
7.4 Proportion of fish stocks within safe biological 
limits 
7.5 Proportion of total water resources used   
7.6 Proportion of terrestrial and marine areas 
protected 
7.7 Proportion of species threatened with extinction 
Target 7.C: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe 
drinking water and basic sanitation 
7.8 Proportion of population using an improved 
drinking water source 
7.9 Proportion of population using an improved 
sanitation facility 
Target 7.D: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 
100 million slum dwellers 
7.10 Proportion of urban population living in slums8    
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development 
Target 8.A: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading 
and financial system 
 
Includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction – both 
nationally and internationally 
 
Target 8.B: Address the special needs of the least developed countries 
 
Includes: tariff and quota free access for the least developed countries' exports; enhanced 
programme of debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) and cancellation of 
official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty 
reduction 
 
 
Target 8.C: Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small island 
developing States (through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of 
Small Island Developing States and the outcome of the twenty-second special session of 
the General Assembly) 
 
 
 
Target 8.D: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through 
national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term 
Some of the indicators listed below are monitored 
separately for the least developed countries (LDCs), 
Africa, landlocked developing countries and small 
island developing States. 
Official development assistance (ODA) 
8.1 Net ODA, total and to the least developed 
countries, as percentage of OECD/DAC donors’ 
gross national income 
8.2 Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable 
ODA of OECD/DAC donors to basic social 
services (basic education, primary health care, 
nutrition, safe water and sanitation) 
8.3 Proportion of bilateral official development 
assistance of OECD/DAC donors that is untied 
8.4 ODA received in landlocked developing 
countries as a proportion of their gross national 
incomes 
8.5 ODA received in small island developing States 
as a proportion of their gross national incomes 
Market access 
8.6 Proportion of total developed country imports (by 
value and excluding arms) from developing 
countries and least developed countries, 
admitted free of duty 
8.7 Average tariffs imposed by developed countries                                                         
8 The actual proportion of people living in slums is measured by a proxy, represented by the urban population living in households with at least one of the four 
characteristics: (a) lack of access to improved water supply; (b) lack of access to improved sanitation; (c) overcrowding (3 or more persons per room); and (d) dwellings 
made of non-durable material. 
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on agricultural products and textiles and clothing 
from developing countries 
8.8 Agricultural support estimate for OECD countries 
as a percentage of their gross domestic product 
8.9 Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade 
capacity 
Debt sustainability 
8.10 Total number of countries that have reached 
their HIPC decision points and number that have 
reached their HIPC completion points 
(cumulative) 
8.11 Debt relief committed under HIPC and MDRI 
Initiatives 
8.12 Debt service as a percentage of exports of 
goods and services 
Target 8.E: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable 
essential drugs in developing countries 
8.13 Proportion of population with access to 
affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis 
Target 8.F: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new 
technologies, especially information and communications 
8.14 Fixed-telephone subscriptions per 100 
inhabitants  
8.15 Mobile-cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants 
8.16 Internet users per 100 inhabitants 
Source: United Nations 
  
 
 
48  
Figure A-1:  Schooling Levels in Tanzania Before and After UPE Initiatives 
 
Source: DHS 
 
Tanzania implemented a formal UPE program in 2001.  This mostly entailed the 
elimination of school user fees.  As we can see in this chart, spikes in schooling levels 
occurred for the young children in the first survey period following this reform (2004), 
but older children had essentially the same schooling levels as those in their same age 
cohorts five and eight years earlier.  In the second survey following reforms (2009), we 
see again that schooling levels are rising, but the gap now begins to close later, as we 
would expect given the previous results.  However, the gap does not close completely as 
in the previous survey.  It appears that some older children are benefitting from these 
reforms in addition to the younger children that make up the treatment group. 
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